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A.

Introduction1

“Man is the only creature that refuses to be
what he is.”—Albert Camus (1951, p.11)

Homo sapiens has been such a prolific species, simply because we are very good at relentlessly adapting to our environment. At
the most basic level, we have won control
over fire and tools to forge a new world
around us, we build shelter and weave clothes
to repel the brutal elements, and we raise
animals and crops for predictability in our
meals. With our intellect and resourcefulness, we are thereby better able to survive
this world.
However, it is not just the world around us
that we desire to change. Since the beginning
of history, we also have wanted to become
more than human, to become Homo superior.
From the godlike command of Gilgamesh, to
the lofty ambitions of Icarus, to the preternatural strength of Beowulf, to the mythical
skills of Shaolin monks, and to various shamans and shapeshifters throughout the
world’s cultural history, we have dreamt—and
still dream—of transforming ourselves to
overcome our all-too-human limitations.

1

An abridged version of this report appears in:
Patrick Lin and Fritz Allhoff, “Untangling the Debate. The Ethics of Human Enhancement”, Na
noEthics: Ethics for Technologies that Converge
at the Nanoscale (2008) 2: 251-264.

In practice, this means that we improve our
minds through education, disciplined thinking,
and meditation; we improve our bodies with a
sound diet and physical exercise; and we train
with weapons and techniques to defend ourselves from those who would conspire to kill.
But today, something seems to be different.
With ongoing work to unravel the mysteries
of our minds and bodies, coupled with the art
and science of emerging technologies, we are
near the start of the Human Enhancement
Revolution.
Now we are not limited to “natural” methods
to enhance ourselves or to merely wield tools
such as a hammer or binoculars or a calculator. We are beginning to incorporate technology within our very bodies, which may
hold moral significance that we need to consider. These technologies promise great benefits for humanity—such as increased productivity and creativity, longer lives, more serenity, stronger bodies and minds, and more—
though, as we will discuss later, there is a
question whether these things translate into
happier lives, which many see as the point of
it all (President’s ouncil on ioethics, 2003;
Persaud, 2006).
As examples of emerging technologies in the
last year or so, a couple imaginative inventions in particular, among many, are closing
the gap even more between science fiction
and the real world. Scientists have conceptualized an electronic-packed contact lens that
may provide the wearer with telescopic and
night vision or act as an omnipresent digital
monitor to receive and relay information
(Parviz, et al., 2008). Another innovation is a
touch display designed to be implanted just
under the skin that would activate special
tattoo ink on one’s arm to form images, such
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as telephone-number keys to punch or even a
video to watch (Mielke, 2008). Together with
ever-shrinking computing devices, we appear
to be moving closer to cybernetic organisms
(or “cyborgs”), that is, where machines are
integrated with our bodies or at least with our
clothing in the nearer-term. Forget about
Pocket PCs, mobile phones, GPS devices, and
other portable gadgets; we might soon be
able to communicate and access those capabilities without having to carry any external
device, thus raising our productivity, efficiency, response time, and other desirable measures—in short, enabling us to even better
survive our world.
Technology is clearly a game-changing field.
The invention of such things as the printing
press, gunpowder, automobiles, computers,
vaccines, and so on, has profoundly changed
the world, for the better we hope. But at the
same time, they have also led to unforeseen
consequences, or perhaps consequences that
might have been foreseen and addressed had
we bothered to investigate them. Least of all,
they have disrupted the status quo, which is
not necessarily a terrible thing in and of itself;
but unnecessary and dramatic disruptions,
such as mass displacements of workers or
industries, have real human costs to them. As
we will discuss, this may well be the case with
human enhancement technologies, enabled
by advances in nanotechnology, microelectro-mechanical systems (MEMS), genetic
engineering, robotics, cognitive science, information technology, pharmacology, and
other fields (Roco and Bainbridge, 2003).2

2

For an overview of ethical and social issues of
nanotechnology beyond its role in human enhancement, see Lin and Allhoff, 2007; Lin, 2008;
Allhoff et al., forthcoming.

In this special report, we examine many ethical and social issues surrounding human enhancement technologies. For instance, on the
issue of whether such technologies ought to
be regulated or otherwise restricted, one position is that (more than minimal) regulation
would hinder personal freedom or autonomy,
infringing on some natural or political right to
improve our own bodies, minds, and lives as
we see fit (Naam, 2005; Bailey, 2005; Harris,
2007; Allhoff et al., forthcoming). Others,
however, advocate strong regulation—and
even a research moratorium—to protect
against unintended effects on society, such as
the presumably-undesirable creation of a new
class of enhanced persons who could outwit,
outplay, and outlast “normal” or unenhanced
persons for jobs, in schools, at sporting contests, and so on, among other reasons (Fukuyama, 2003, 2006; Friends of the Earth,
2006). Still others seek a sensible middle path
between stringent regulation and individual
liberty (Hughes, 2004; Greely, 2005).
No matter where one is aligned on this issue,
it is clear that the human enhancement debate is a deeply passionate and personal one,
striking at the heart of what it means to be
human. Some see it as a way to fulfill or even
transcend our potential; others see it as a
darker path towards becoming Frankenstein’s
monster. To help untangle this debate, we
have organized this report as the following list
of questions and answers, starting with background issues and moving to specific concerns, including: freedom & autonomy, health
& safety, fairness & equity, societal disruption, and human dignity.
Each question-and-answer pair is largely selfcontained, allowing the reader to skip to
those issues of interest without affecting continuity much. In doing so, we are mindful of
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our audience, which we take to be primarily
the broader public who is not as familiar with
the human enhancement debate but interested in engaging it. At the same time, we
offer original analysis that academics and
other experts in the field may find useful.
These discussions are not exhaustive; indeed,
many of these questions would require a
book-length treatise for any satisfying answer.
Rather, we intend for this report to broadly
survey the human enhancement landscape
and its main contours, not its more intricate
rabbit holes and subtler terrain, as other and
future investigations will explore.
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B.

Definition & Distinctions

1. What is human enhancement?
To begin with, we need to draw several important distinctions.3 Strictly speaking, “human enhancement” includes any activity by
which we improve our bodies, minds, or abilities—things we do to enhance our well-being.
So reading a book, eating vegetables, doing
homework, and exercising may count as enhancing ourselves, though we do not mean
the term this way in our discussion here.
These so-called “natural” human enhancements are morally uninteresting because they
appear to be unproblematic to the extent that
it is difficult to see why we should not be
permitted to improve ourselves through diet,
education, physical training, and so on; yet it
is still an open question whether emerging,
engineered enhancements might or ought to
be unproblematic as well.
Rather, allow us to stipulate for the moment
that “human enhancement” is about boosting
our capabilities beyond the species-typical
level or statistically-normal range of functioning for an individual (Norm Daniels, 2000).
Relatedly, “human enhancement” can be understood to be different from “therapy”,
which is about treatments aimed at pathologies that compromise health or reduce one’s
3

We recognize that some advocates of human
enhancement argue against making such a distinction, especially between therapy and enhancement (e.g., Bostrom and Roache, 2008),
which seems to more easily justify unrestricted
human enhancement. Even if this position is
tenable, we do not want to take that point for
granted here, which we will discuss in question
4 below.

level of functioning below this species-typical
or statistically-normal level (Eric Juengst,
1997). Another way to think about human
enhancement technologies, as opposed to
therapy, is that they change the structure and
function of the body (Greely, 2005). Admittedly, none of these definitions is immune to
objections, but they are nevertheless useful
as a starting point in thinking about the distinction, including whether there really is such
a distinction.
Thus, corrective eyeglasses, for instance,
would be considered therapy rather than enhancement, since they serve to bring your
vision back to normal; but strapping on a pair
of night-vision binoculars would count as human enhancement, because they give you
sight beyond the range of any unassisted human vision. As another example, using steroids to help muscular dystrophy patients regain
lost strength is a case of therapy; but steroid
use by otherwise-healthy athletes would give
them new strength beyond what humans typically have (thereby enabling them to set new
performance records in sports). And growing
or implanting webbing between one’s fingers
and toes to enable better swimming changes
the structure and function of those body
parts, counting then as a case of human enhancement and not therapy.
Likewise, as it concerns the mind, taking Ritalin to treat attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is aimed at correcting the deficit; but taken by otherwise-normal students
to enable them to focus better in studying for
exams is a form of human enhancement. And
where reading a book may indeed make you
more knowledgeable, it does not make you so
much smarter than most everyone else or
push your intellect past natural limits; on the
other hand, a computer chip implanted into
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your brain that gives you direct access to
Google or spreadsheets would provide mental
capabilities beyond the species-typical level.

2. Is the natural-artificial distinction
morally significant in this debate?
As we mentioned, strictly speaking, human
enhancements seem to include such activities
as reading a book, eating vegetables, doing
homework, and exercising. To the extent that
these “natural” enhancements are ethically
unproblematic, it would be tempting to draw
a line here in the human enhancement debate such that “artificial” or “unnatural” enhancements require moral evaluation.
However, the natural-versus-artificial distinction, as a way to identify human enhancements, may prove most difficult to defend
given the vagueness of the term “natural/”
For instance, if we can consider X to be natural if X exists without any human intervention
or can be performed without humanengineered artifacts, then eating food (that is
merely found but perhaps not farmed) and
exercising (e.g., running barefoot but not lifting dumbbells) would still be considered natural, but reading a book no longer qualifies as a
natural activity (enhancement or not), since
books do not exist without humans.
Or if we allow that some human-dependent
things can be natural, e.g., a flint axe or book,
depending on their level of complexity or the
amount of engineering required, this seems
to specify an arbitrary requirement which too
may be difficult (but not impossible?) to defend. If we want to say that reading books is
generally a form of natural enhancement (because books are not as complex to create as,
say, a computer), would some books that are

difficult to write or have taken years of research then count as artificial enhancements?
What about reading a simple e-book on Amazon’s Kindle™, which is a clearly a complex
and engineered device?
Further, the natural-artificial distinction often
rests on theological or teleological premises,
i.e., that we have God-given goals or limits in
life such that being able to lift 500 pounds
over one’s head or living to age 300 is profanely unnatural and in violation of nature or
God’s will/ We do not wish to be mired in
such theological issues, as important as they
are to theists, though we return briefly to
them in question 16.

3. Is the internal-external distinction
morally significant in this debate?
The previous examples suggest a further distinction we should make. By “human enhancement” we do not mean the mere use of
tools, as this would render the concept impotent, turning nearly everything we do into
cases of human enhancement. But if and
when these tools are integrated into our bodies, rather than employed externally, then
we will consider them to be instances of human enhancement (by stipulation again, for
the moment). Of course, this raises the question: What is so special about incorporating
tools as part of our bodies, as opposed to
merely using them externally to the body (Bostrom and Roache, 2008)? That is, why
should the former count as human enhancement, but not the latter? A neural implant
that gives access to Google and the rest of the
online world does not seem to be different in
kind to using a laptop computer or Pocket PC
to access the same, so why should it matter
that we are imbedding computing power into
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our heads rather than carrying the same capabilities with us by way of external devices?
We will not attempt to give a full discussion of
that point here, though it will be important to
explore the issue further, except to suggest
that integrating tools into our bodies (and
perhaps with our everyday clothing to the
extent that we are rarely without our clothes)
appears to give us unprecedented advantages
which may be morally significant. These advantages include having easier, immediate,
and “always-on” access to those new capabilities as if they were a natural part of our being;
we would never be without those devices, as
we might forget to bring a laptop computer
with us to a meeting. And assimilating tools
into our persons creates an intimate or enhanced connection with our tools that evolves
our notion of personal identity, more so than
simply owning things (as wearing name-brand
clothes might boost one’s sense of self). This
may translate into a substantial advantage for
the enhanced person, more so than gained by
purchasing an office computer or reading
books or training with the best coaches.

permanent by embedding or integrating it
into our bodies is considered human enhancement, then it is not clear whether such
clothing ought to count as enhancement as
well. On one hand, clothes can be cast aside
like an !pple iPhone™, for instance, and (or
because) they are external to us; yet we are
almost never without clothes, which may not
be so easy to shed once they are on. So while
smart clothes may not be as permanent as,
say, a computer chip implanted in one’s
brains, they may approximate the always-on
or 24/7 access characteristic that, we stipulate, tracks the enhancement-versus-mere
tools distinction. Eyeglasses, too, that are not
cumbersome to wear all day (e.g., in contrast
to bulky, night-vision goggles today) and that
give us super-vision or double as a computer
display might plausibly be called an enhancement. Therefore, we do not recognize the
central distinction in this debate as between
internal or implanted tools and tools external
to our bodies, which is a distinction that
seems to carry less prima facie moral relevance and would need greater argument to
establish.

Therefore, we might reasonably understand
the distinction between human enhancement
and mere tools by looking for an always-on
(i.e., on-demand or permanent) feature, as
opposed to the temporary or contingent
access of our daily gadgets and tools (e.g., a
mobile phone can be easily lost, stolen, or left
behind). But even so, this attempt at a definition still needs further defense, as there are
grey areas that need to be resolved.

This is not to say that an enhancementversus-tools distinction is ultimately defensible or not, but only that it does not help an
early investigation into the ethics of using
such technological innovations—whatever we
want to call them—to consider “enhancement” so broadly that it obscures our intuitive
understanding of the concept and makes everything that gives us an advantage in life into
an enhancement.

For instance, one grey area is that of “smart
clothes”—clothing with devices embedded
into them, or clothing made from new, dynamic materials that may also serve as armor
or for medical purposes. If making a device

If our considered distinction here cannot ultimately be defended—that is, if there is no
moral significance in using an enhancing device internally or externally to our bodies—
then the implication is that all tools, from
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hammers to hardhats and from cars to computers, ought to be recognized as forms of
human enhancement/ !nd there’s a prima
facie case to be made that, if hammers and
computers can be used without moral risk,
then more fantastical tools, e.g., neural implants or gene therapy to halt aging or give
superhuman strength, should also be morally
permissible. However, this is not the end of
the debate, since we might agree that human
enhancement technologies per se are not morally problematic, but their use in certain applications or areas of life could still be questionable.

4. Is the therapy-enhancement distinction
morally significant in this debate?
Returning to an issue previously raised in
question 1—and as a perhaps more critical
distinction to elucidate—some scholars have
reasonably objected that there is no real distinction between therapy and enhancement,
which would mean that our working definition is inadequate. For instance, how should
we think about vaccinations: are they a form
of therapy, or are they an enhancement of
our immune system (Daniels, 2000; Harris,
2007; Bostrom and Roache, 2008)? On one
hand, a vaccination seems to be an enhancement in that there is no existing pathology it
is attempting to cure, merely a possible or
likely pathology we wish to avoid; but we are
drawn to declare it as some form of therapy—
perhaps preventative therapy—given its close
association with medicine? And if enhancements in general are ultimately found to be
socially or ethically problematic, then counting vaccinations as enhancement opens the
possibility that it should be regulated or restricted, which would create a serious public
health disaster as well as a counter-example

to the claim that enhancements are problematic. Thus, even critics of human enhancement may be loathe to put vaccinations in the
enhancement bucket, though there does not
seem to be an obviously superior reason to
think otherwise.
Another dilemma: If a genius were to sustain
a head injury, thereby reducing her IQ to
merely the “average” or “species-normal”
range, would raising her intelligence back to
its initial “genius” level count as therapy or
enhancement (Bostrom and Roache, 2008)?
Either one would seem plausible, but is there
a non-arbitrary reason for answering the
question either way? If an enhancement,
then how do we explain the difference between that and a clear (or clearer) case of
therapy in which we return an “average” person who sustains a head injury back to the
“normal” IQ range?
The therapy-enhancement distinction holds
real stakes, beyond athletic and academic
competition. Recent news reports show that
the US military is increasingly prescribing antidepressants to soldiers in combat to alleviate
post-traumatic stress as well as stimulants to
counteract sleep deprivation—actions which
could be viewed as either creating a more
effective, level-headed soldier or returning
the soldier to the initial “normal” state of
combat readiness, further blurring the distinction (M. Thompson, 2008; Saletan, 2008).4

4

However, if the military were to prescribe such
medications prior to combat, then one could
make the case for counting that as an enhancement; but this may take us full circle back to the
vaccination question, particularly as soldiers are
routinely vaccinated against bio-threats such as
anthrax.
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The above cases notwithstanding, we would
agree that there are difficulties in precisely
defining “human enhancement” (as there is
with making clear definitions of nearly any
other concept), but maintaining the enhancement-therapy distinction, at least until
it can be more fully explored, is nonetheless
important for several reasons:
First, to the extent that pro-enhancement
advocates are primarily the ones arguing
against the therapy-enhancement distinction,
if a goal is to engage the anti-enhancement
camp, then it would make for a far stronger
case to meet those critics on their own
ground (i.e., to grant the assumption that
such a distinction exists). If it proves overly
charitable to grant this assumption such that
the pro-enhancement position is too difficult
to defend without it, then perhaps more attention needs to be paid in arguing against
the distinction in the first place, given that the
debate may hinge on this fundamental issue.
Second, by not making these distinctions,
specifically between therapy and enhancement, it may be too easy to argue that all
forms of human enhancement are morally
permissible given that the things we count as
therapy are permissible. That is to say, we
risk making a straw man argument that does
not make a compelling case either for or
against any aspect of human enhancement.
Again, if the human enhancement debate
turns on this distinction, then much more attention should be paid to defending or criticizing the distinction than has been to date.
Third, at least part of the reason that human
enhancement is believed by both sides of the
debate to be the most important controversy
in science and society this new century (Hurlbut, 2006) seems to be that it represents a

collision between our intuitions and our actions. For instance, critics may believe that
human enhancement technologies give an
unfair advantage to some persons, fracturing
local or global societies (even more) between
the haves and have-nots (Fukuyama 2002,
2006; President’s ouncil on ioethics, 2003Selgelid, 2007). Yet, at the same time, they
seem to endorse—to the extent that they
have not raised objections to—our use of existing technologies (e.g., mobile phones,
computers, Internet) that also seem to countenance the same division to which human
enhancement technologies are said to lead
us.
As another example, advocates of human enhancement may believe that individual autonomy should trump health and safety concerns, e.g., athletes should be permitted to
take steroids or adults should be allowed to
take mood-enhancing drugs at will (Naam,
2005; Savulescu and Foddy, 2007). Yet, at the
same time, they do not offer objections to
keeping some drugs illegal, such as crystal
meth or crack cocaine, which becomes an
even more complicated dilemma if they advocate legalizing other contraband such as marijuana.
This is not to say that these tensions with our
intuitions are irresolvable, but only that
“common sense” is at stake for both sides of
the debate. And the initial intuition for the
overwhelming majority of us is that there is a
therapy-enhancement distinction (since we
understand “therapy” and “enhancement” as
meaningfully discrete terms, even if some
cases do not neatly fit into either category).
So it would be more interesting for proenhancement advocates to reconcile their
position with that intuition, if possible, rather
than to reject the distinction, which is less
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satisfying. Or if the therapy-enhancement
distinction really is untenable, then more vigorous argument seems to be needed before
we are prepared to cast aside our intuition.
Fourth, the famous philosophical puzzle “The
Paradox of the Heap” should be recalled here.
Given a heap of sand with N number of grains
of sand, if we remove one grain of sand, we
are still left with a heap of sand (that now
only has N-1 grains of sand). If we remove
one more grain, we are again left with a heap
of sand (that now has N-2 grains). If we extend this line of reasoning and continue to
remove grains of sand, we see that there is no
clear point P where we can definitely say that
a heap of sand exists on one side of P, but less
than a heap exists on the other side. In other
words, there is no clear distinction between a
heap of sand and a less-than-a-heap or even
no sand at all. However, the wrong conclusion to draw here is that there is no difference
between them or that the distinction between a heap and no-heap should be discarded (or between being bald and having
hair, as a variation of the paradox goes).
Likewise, it would seem fallacious to conclude
that there is no difference between therapy
and enhancement or that we should dispense
with the distinction. It may still be the case
that there is no moral difference between the
two, but we cannot arrive at it through the
argument that there is no clear defining line
or that there are some cases (such as vaccinations, etc.) that make the line fuzzy. As with
“heap”, the terms “therapy” and “enhancement” may simply be vaguely constructed and
require more precision to clarify the distinction.

defensible and illuminative, at least where it
aligns with our intuitions. Even if it is not,
again, this does not mean the end of the human enhancement debate: it could still be
that some enhancements (and therapies) are
morally problematic in certain applications or
areas of life, i.e., contexts may matter.

Therefore, at least for the time being and for
the purposes of this report, we will assume
that a therapy-enhancement distinction is
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them to be unproblematic, especially at a
start of debate exactly about those questions.

C.

Contexts & Scenarios

5. Why would contexts matter in the ethics
of human enhancement?
We allow that it may ultimately be the case
that the therapy-enhancement distinction
may be shallow and/or that enhancements
per se are not morally relevant; but we leave
those as open questions to be explored in this
embryonic stage of the debate. It is possible,
and perhaps likely, that human enhancements
need to be considered separately according to
their type or application in an ethics investigation. So, for instance, even if we do not consider vaccines as preventative therapy (which
may be the more natural way to see it) but
view them as enhancements of our immune
system, that does not imply that all enhancements are morally unproblematic.
What counts as an enhancement and whether
it is morally relevant seems to be contextdependent. For example, we can imagine a
society in which strict equality is the allimportant value, trumping individual rights to
life, liberty, knowledge, and so on; thus immunizing a person from a serious disease
might be prohibited in such a world, so to not
upset egalitarian values or disrupt social institutions that strongly rely on a certain range of
life expectancy, e.g., a social security system.
Another example: freely burning fossil fuels
was less morally significant in 1910 than it is
in 2010, given our current awareness of global
warming, pollution, and their causes and effects. Therefore, context matters, and so it
seems premature to say that all enhancement
are morally worrisome, irrespective of context; but it is also premature to declare all of

For a similar reason, it does not really help to
dismantle
or obviate
the therapyenhancement distinction by claiming that
“everything good is an enhancement” as we
first considered in question 1—that education, diet, exercise, etc. are all enhancements,
and because these instances are unobjectionable, then no enhancement is intrinsically
problematic. Besides being a loose generalization, we could make an argument that even
education, diet, etc. do have ethical implications (in that they may create inequities
among individuals), but that these implications are outweighed by other considerations,
such as liberty, the value of self-improvement,
and so on; and that is why education, diet,
etc. are unobjectionable, all things considered.
Or we can make an argument that strict
equality is not morally required in the first
place, given the natural and manageable
range of variations in our species; but if some
future vaccine takes us well beyond this
“normal” range, e.g., super-longevity or super-strength, our social systems (including law
and public policy) are not equipped to account for those extra abilities, thereby raising
latent issues of equity, fairness, access, etc.
back to the forefront. Similarly, we can imagine a world in which cognitive enhancements no longer hold much controversy as
they do today, after social structures in the
future have adapted to account for them—
just like, e.g., steroid use in sports might no
longer be an ethical issue (perhaps only a
health issue) if we create separate competitions for the enhanced as well as unenhanced.
Again, context seems to matter.
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6.

What are some examples of enhancement for cognitive performance?

In the area of improving mental performance,
individuals are already using pharmaceuticals
available today to achieve such goals as increased productivity, creativity, serenity, and
happiness. We previously mentioned Ritalin
use, intended for ADHD patients, by otherwise-normal students to boost concentration
as a way to study more effectively. In sports,
drugs such as beta-blockers, intended to treat
high blood pressure and other disorders by
slowing down the heart rate, have been used
to reduce anxiety as a way to boost physical
performance, such as in preparing for an important and nerve-racking putt in golf or
steadying an archer’s hand to better release
the arrow in between heartbeats. In warfare,
anti-depressants and stimulants have been
used to treat post-traumatic stress and sleep
deprivation, thereby creating better, more
effective soldiers. And, of course, hallucinogenic and other recreational drugs, including
alcohol, continue to be used (and used famously by some authors and artists) to
achieve greater creativity, relaxation, and
even enlightenment.
In the future, as technology becomes more
integrated with our bodies, we can expect
neural implants of the kind we mentioned
above that effectively puts computer chips
into our brains or allows devices to be
plugged directly into our heads, giving us always-on access to information as well as unprecedented information-processing powers.
New and future virtual reality programs are
able to much better simulate activities, for
instance, to train law enforcement officers
and soldiers in dangerous situations so that

they can respond better to similar events in
the real world.

7. What are some examples of enhancement for physical performance?
In the area of physical performance, steroids
use by athletes is one of the most obvious
examples. Cosmetic surgery has also grown in
popularity, not for corrective purposes but to
increase (perceived) attractiveness, and this
has ethical and genetic implications (Scott,
2009). Prosthetic limbs have improved to
such a degree that they are already enabling
greater than normal strength and capabilities
to those that use them, sparking a debate on
whether athletes with those artificial limbs
may participate in the Olympics (Edwards,
2008a).
In the future, we can expect continuing advances in robotics and bionanotechnology to
give us cybernetic body parts, from bionic
arms to artificial noses and ears, that surpass
the capabilities of our natural body. Today,
research organizations such as MIT’s Institute
for Soldier Nanotechnologies are working on
an exoskeleton to give the wearer superhuman strength as well as flexible battlesuits
that can, for instance, harden when needed
to create a splint or tourniquet to attend to
injuries more quickly and effectively (MIT,
2008). And we previously mentioned innovative designs such as for contact lenses that
enable us to see in the dark or receive information from a miniature digital monitor. Further, designs have already been drawn for
even more fantastic innovations such as a
respirocyte: an artificial red blood cell that
holds a reservoir of oxygen (Freitas, 1998). A
respirocyte would come in handy for, say, a
heart attack victim to continue breathing for
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an extra hour until medical treatment is available, despite a lack of blood circulation to the
lungs or anywhere else. But in an otherwisehealthy athlete, a respirocyte could boost performance by delivering extra oxygen to the
muscles, as if the person were breathing from
a pure oxygen tank.
And perhaps as an example of both mental
and physical enhancement, we should also
consider life extension, whether it comes by
curing fatal pathologies (such as cancer) or
rejuvenating the body/mind or developing
anti-aging medicine, and whether it enables
us to live another 20 or 100 or 1,000 years
(radical life extension). This is a particularly
contentious issue in the human engineering
debate, not just for obvious concerns related
to the burden of overpopulation on quality of
life or loss of meaning in life, but also because
it seems that we are already—and presumably unproblematically—extending our lives
through better nutrition, medicine, exercise,
sanitation, and so forth; yet there is something troubling to many about the prospect of
radical life extension, even if we can all agree
that, in principle, more life is better than less
life. We will return to this in question 13 below.

8. Should a non-therapeutic procedure that
provides no net benefit be called an “enhancement”?
Some applications of technology or modifications of our bodies may seem gratuitous, such
as attempting to physically transform into a
lizard by tattooing scales all over one’s body
and forking one’s tongue, or into a cat by implanting whiskers, sharpening teeth and clipping one’s ears, or into something other than
human with implanted horns in one’s fore-

head; all of these procedures have been done
already. In the future, we can envision the
possibility that prosthetic flippers, designed
today for dolphins, along with artificial gills,
etc., might be requested by humans who
want to transform into an aquatic animal.
This type of enhancement, of course, brings
to the forefront the question whether “enhancement” is the right word to use in the
debate in the first place, as opposed to simply
“human engineering” or a more neutral term
that does not imply improvement. Indeed,
even in cases where technology boosts mental and physical capabilities, it seems that we
cannot predict with any accuracy whether
there will be any negative psychological or
physiological side-effects that will offset the
intended benefits of a particular enhancement. For instance, in drinking alcohol as a
mood-enhancer of sorts, we already know
that it can hold the unintended effect of a
painful hangover, and steroids taken by athletes can have disastrous health consequences; in such cases, we cannot easily say
the benefits outweigh the harms.
Moreover, if human enhancement can be ultimately defended, then un-enhancements
may seem to be morally permissible as well, if
individual autonomy is the most important
value to consider in the debate (P. Thompson,
2008). There are already medical cases in
which: individuals want to amputate some
healthy limb from their bodies (Dyer, 2000);
parents want to stunt the growth of their bedridden child to keep her portable and easier
to care for (Edwards, 2008b); and deaf parents who specifically want a deaf baby in selecting embryos for in vitro fertilization (Dennis, 2004). Un-enhancements aside, we will
continue to use “enhancement” in this report
for the most part, since there is a presumption that whatever technology is integrated
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with our bodies will be expected to deliver
some net benefit, real or perceived (otherwise, why do it?). Further, we will limit our
discussion here primarily to those technologies that enhance human cognitive and physical abilities, rather than seemingly-gratuitous
procedures or un-enhancements.

Ethics of Human Enhancement: 25 Questions & Answers
Copyright 2009 © Allhoff, Lin, Moor, and Weckert. All trademarks, logos and images are the property of their respective owners.

▌ 18

D.

Freedom & Autonomy

9. Could we justify human enhancement
technologies by appealing to our right to
be free?
There is perhaps no greater value, at least in
democracies, than the cherished concept of
freedom, loosely defined here as the absence
of constraints. But because freedom is central to the issue of human enhancement, it
adds much fuel to the impassioned debate.
Pro-enhancement advocates have argued
against regulating enhancements on the
grounds that it would infringe on our fundamental ability to choose how we want to live
our own lives (Naam, 2005; Bailey, 2005; Harris, 2007). Or, in other words, if enhancing
our bodies does not hurt anyone (other than
possibly ourselves; more on this in question
10), then why should we be prevented from
doing so? This is a common objection—
arguing especially against governmental intervention—to any number of proposals that
involve regulation, from hiring practices to
home improvements to school clothing and so
on.
Though freedom may be viewed in democracies as a “sacred cow” that ought not be corralled, the reality is that we do not have complete freedom in the areas of life that we
think we do anyway. As examples, freedom
of the press and freedom of speech do not
protect the individual from charges of libel,
slander, or inciting panic by yelling “Fire!” in a
crowded theater; our privacy expectations
quietly give way to security measures, such as
searches on our property and persons at airports or eavesdropping on our communica-

tions; and even ancestral homes built by the
hands of one’s forefathers could be unilaterally seized (and demolished) by the state under
eminent domain laws. This is to say that
whatever rights we have also imply responsibilities and exist within some particular political system, therefore it is not unreasonable to
expect or define certain limits for those rights,
especially where they conflict with other
rights and obligations.
Maximal freedom is a hallmark of a laissezfaire or minimal state, but a democratic society is not compelled to endorse such a stance,
as some political philosophers have suggested
(e.g., Nozick, 1974). Nor would reasonable
people necessarily want unrestricted freedom
anyway, e.g., no restrictions or background
checks for gun ownership. Even the most liberal democracy today understands the value
of regulations as a way to enhance our freedom. For instance, our economic system is
not truly a “free market”: though we may advocate freedom in general, regulations exist
not only to protect our rights, but also to
create an orderly process that greases the
economic wheel, accelerating both innovations and transactions. As a simpler example,
by imposing laws on traffic, we can actually
increase our freedom: by driving forward on
only one side of the road, for instance, we can
be (more) assured that we will not be a victim
of a head-on collision, which makes driving
faster a more sensible proposition.
There is another sense, related to free will, in
which cognitive enhancements may be infringing: if an enhancement, such as a moodaltering drug or neural implant, interferes or
alters our deliberative process, then it is an
open question whether or not we are truly
acting freely while under the influence of the
enhancement. For instance, a “citizen chip”
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embedded in the brain might cause us to be
unswervingly patriotic and hold different values than we would otherwise have. Further,
external pressure from peers, employers,
competitors, national security, and others to
accept a particular enhancement also may
unduly influence one’s decision making. (Guston, Parsi, and Tosi, 2007.)

10. Could we justify enhancing humans if it
harms no one other than perhaps the individual?
To justify restrictions on our freedom and autonomy, of course, we would need strong,
compelling reasons to offset that prima facie
harm; specifically, we need to identify conflicting values that ought to be factored into
our policymaking. One possible reason is that
human enhancement technologies may pose
a health risk to the person operated upon,
similar to illegal or unprescribed steroids use
by athletes: given how precious little we still
know about how our brains and other biological systems work, any tinkering with those
systems would likely give rise to unintended
effects, from mild to most serious (President’s
Council on Bioethics, 2003). Even drinking
pure water—perhaps the safest thing we can
do to our own bodies—may have some
harms. For example, maybe we become dependent on fluoridated water to prevent
tooth decay or drink too much water which
dilutes sodium in the body to dangerously-low
or fatal levels. Or consider that many of the
foods we eat everyday are suspected to have
some causal connection to disease or unwanted conditions. It is therefore quite likely
that making radical changes to our bodies
undoubtedly will have surprising side-effects.

Is this reason enough to restrict human enhancement technologies, for the sake of protecting the would-be patient? The answer is
not clear. Even if such technologies prove to
be so dangerous or risky that we strongly believe we need to protect individuals from
their own decisions to use those technologies
(through paternalistic regulations), the wellinformed individual might circumvent this
issue by freely and knowingly consenting to
those risks, thereby removing this reason to
restrict use.
But even this case does not solve the conflict
between autonomy and health/safety. First,
it is not always clear whether a person’s consent is sufficiently informed or not. For instance, consider a partygoer who may have
heard that smoking cigarettes can be addictive and harmful but nonetheless begins to
smoke anyway; this seems to be a lessinformed decision than one made by a person
with a parent whose smoking caused a specific and horrible illness (and associated expenses). Furthermore, the partygoer may be
unduly influenced by peers or movies that
glamorize smoking. So paternalistic regulations could be justified under some circumstances; e.g., where risks are not adequately
communicated or understood, for children,
and so on.
Second, the assumption that a procedure to
implant some human enhancement technology may affect the health and safety of only
that patient appears to be much too generous. Indeed, it is rare to find any human activity that has absolutely no impact on other
persons, either directly or indirectly, such that
our own freedom or autonomy is the only
value at stake and clearly should be protected. For instance, opponents to regulating
such activities as gambling, recreational drugs
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(including smoking tobacco), prostitution,
segregation, and so forth commonly cite the
need to protect their freedom or rights as the
primary objection to those regulations. Yet,
this objection ignores the opposing argument,
which is that such activities may harm other
persons, either actually or statistically.
To look at just one of many examples, at first
glance, unfettered gambling seems to affect
only the gambler (it is his money to win or
lose, so the argument goes); but a broader
analysis would point out that many gamblers
have families whose bank accounts are being
risked and that desperate gamblers may
commit crimes to finance their addiction,
never mind harms to the out-of-control gambler himself. Even marijuana use, which in
many cases may be justified and allegedly
harms no one, might be traced back to dangerous cartels that terrorize or bully the local
population. Furthermore, irresponsible use of
the drug could cause accidents or the user to
neglect his or her obligations, family, etc.
Notice here that we are not arguing that activities such as gambling and recreational drug
use should be completely banned, but only
that some measure of oversight seems to be
appropriate for the sake of others, if not also
for the welfare of the individual.
Relating back to the human enhancement
debate, it seems premature to say that only
the would-be enhanced person assumes any
risk, even if the procedure does not affect his
or her germline (i.e., cannot be passed on to
the next generation). The harm or risk to
others could also be indirect: Where steroids
use by athletes sets the presumably-wrong
example for children whose bodies and minds
are still developing, we can anticipate a similar temptation to be created with human enhancement technologies among children.

Even parents may feel pressure—or even an
obligation—to enhance their children, which
arises from the natural desire to want the
best for our children or, in this case, make
them the best they can be (see question 21).
Third, even if the harm that arises from any
given instance of human enhancement is so
small as to be practically negligible, the individual choices to enhance oneself can lead to
aggregate harms that are much larger and
substantial/ For instance, in today’s environmental debate, calls are increasing to limit
activities from lawn care or drinking bottled
water: on one hand, the amount of extra water needed to keep one’s lawn green seems
small, as is also the amount of fertilizer or
pesticide that might leach into the groundwater, but the cumulative effect of millions of
homeowners caring for a pristine patch of
grass can be disastrous for a nation’s water
supply and health.
Likewise, as human enhancement technologies improve and are adopted by more
people, the once-negligible harms that arise
from individual cases may metastasize into
very real harms to large segments of society
(Parfit, 1986). Life extension, as one case,
may appear to be a great benefit for the individual, but on an aggregate scale, it could put
pressure or burdens on families, retirement
programs, overpopulation, and so on; we will
return to this in question 13.
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E.

Fairness & Equity

11. Does human enhancement raise issues of
fairness, access, and equity?
Even if we can understand why there would
be pressure to enhance one’s self or children,
it is important to note the following: advantages gained by enhanced persons also imply
a relative disadvantage for the unenhanced,
whether in sports, employment opportunities,
academic performance, or any other area.
That is to say, fairness is another value to consider in the debate. A related worry is that
the wealthy would be the first adopters of
human enhancement technologies, given that
they can best afford such innovations (like
LASIK eye surgery), thus creating an even
wider gap between the haves and the havenots (McKibben, 2004).
In considering the issue of fairness, we need
to be careful to not conflate it with equity.
Under most economic theories, fairness does
not require that we need to close the gap entirely between economic classes, even when
justice is defined as fairness (Rawls, 1971; for
an application of Rawls to enhancement, see
Allhoff, 2005). Indeed, there are good reasons to think that we want some gap to exist,
for example, to provide incentives for innovations, in order to move up the economic ladder, and to allow flexibility in a workforce to
fill vacancies and perform a wide range of
tasks. At least some competition seems to be
desirable, especially when resources to be
allocated are limited or scarce and when
compared to the historically-unsuccessful alternative of the state attempting to equalize
the welfare of its citizens.

Thus, inequality itself is not so much the
point, though any poverty or decline in welfare related to increased inequality may be a
serious concern. We do not want people to
stop striving to improve their own lives, even
if the situation for others is not improved at
the same time or ever. And natural advantages and inequities already exist without
moral issues anyway; Hobbes recognized that
these organic differences did not give any
individual or group of individuals so much net
advantage that they would be invulnerable to
the “nasty, brutish, and short” conditions that
mark human life (Hobbes, 1651).
Yet if human enhancement technologies develop as predicted, they can afford us a tremendous advantage in life; e.g., over others in
a competition for resources, so much so that
it overstretches the natural range of equality
to the point where inequality becomes a
more salient issue. This is where the gap between enhanced and unenhanced persons
may be too wide to bridge, making the latter
into dinosaurs in a hypercompetitive world. If
we assume that the benefits of being an enhanced person must be largely paid from the
welfare of others, e.g., a job-gain by one person is a job-loss by another, since the others
are now at a relative disadvantage, this may
impoverish the unenhanced, which would
limit their access to such things as healthcare,
legal representation, political influence, and
so on.
Related to the notion of equity is that of fairness. Even if pronounced inequality is morally
permissible, there is still a question of how an
individual accesses or affords a human enhancement technology, which may be unfair
or unacceptably magnify the inequality. If the
distribution of or access to enhancement
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technologies is not obviously unfair, e.g., illegally discriminatory, then perhaps we can justify the resulting inequities. But what would
count as a fair distribution of those technologies? A scheme based on need or productivity or any other single dimension would be
easily defeated by the standard arguments
that they overlook other relevant dimensions
(Rescher, 1980). Even if a market system is
considered to be fair or an acceptable approximation of it, many still object to the unfairness of our starting points, which may result
from bad luck or other arbitrary circumstances, or date back to monarchies, aristocracies, “robber barons”—recall the saying that
behind every great fortune there is a great
crime (de Balzac, 1835). And even if the starting points were fair, the subsequent market
processes would need to be fair in order for
the results (e.g., that only the wealthy can
afford human enhancement technologies,
who then gain significant advantages over the
unenhanced) to be declared fair (Nozick,
1974).

12. Will it matter if there is an “enhancement divide”?
We have heard much about the “digital divide”, but one day there may well be a “nano
divide”: the gap between those who can
access and benefit from nanotechnology and
those without. If there is also an “enhancement divide”, it could prove to be an even
greater disadvantage for those on the wrong
side. They would not be as physically or mentally capable as others. What policies, if any,
should be developed to either avoid or cope
with this situation?
The rise of information and communications
technology (ICT) led to the so-called “digital

divide”: those who did not have adequate
access to the technology were disadvantaged
relative to those who did. While this divide
reflected, by and large, the existing divide
between haves and have-nots, ICT exaggerated that divide (Rooksby and Weckert,
2004). Not long ago, the less-advantaged
within developed societies could listen to the
radio, go to the free public library, and read
inexpensive newspapers. As information and
communication increasingly moved to the
Internet, their access to both information and
communication decreased relative to that by
the more-advantaged. It is feared by some
that nanotechnology will also sharpen and
widen divisions both within societies and between nations: a nanodivide will be created.
Whether or not this happens depends partly
on how nanotechnology develops. If its applications are primarily in enhancing existing
materials, cosmetics, electronics and medicine and if these are relatively inexpensive,
then there may be no increase in inequalities.
However, if they are expensive and particularly useful and desirable, then they probably
will.
This in itself does not show that there is a
problem, of course. There is a problem only if
the created inequalities are unfair and therefore morally wrong. Technologies have both
benefits and costs and inequities can occur in
both. Just as benefits can be distributed unequally, so can the costs, but none of these
inequalities is necessarily wrong, it can be
argued. The argument that they do not matter morally can be derived from a number of
ethical theories, but it also depends on the
particular enhancements in question. Enhancements for a few that enable them to
better solve the world’s environmental problems would satisfy Rawls’ difference principle
in that the extra inequality in ability would
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help the worst off (Rawls, 1971). Enhancements in sporting ability or other abilities that
benefit only the person enhanced would fall
foul of that principle and so perhaps should
not be allowed. They might however, be justified on utilitarian grounds, if they help increase total happiness, or on the basis of
desert or some other way. So the question
“Will it matter if there is an enhancement
divide?”, like many of the questions we explore in this report, cannot be easily answered but will involve an examination of the
enhancements in question and of the underlying ethical theories.
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F.

Societal Disruptions

13. What kind of societal disruptions might
arise from human enhancement?
Fairness and equality are not just theoretical
values, but they have practical effects. Gross
inequality itself, whether fair or not, can motivate the worse-off masses to revolt against a
state or system. But societal disruption need
not be so extreme to be taken seriously. Entire institutions today—as well as the lack
thereof—are based on a specific range of abilities and rough equality of natural assets.
Sports, for instance, would change dramatically, if enhanced persons are permitted to
compete to the clear disadvantage to unenhanced athletes, smashing their previous
records. (This is not to say that sports should
ban enhanced competitors, only that doing so
would have a real, significant affect on careers and expend valuable resources to adjust
sporting programs and contests; and in the
end, it is not clear that sports is better off for
its trouble or that which it has caused.)
Other institutions and systems include economic (jobs), privacy, communications,
pensions, security, and many other areas of
society. For instance, if life-extension technologies can increase our average lifespan by
20 years—let alone the 100+ years predicted
by some futurists (Kurzweil, 2005; de Grey,
2007), and assuming that the extra 20 years
will be a good life, not one bogged down with
illness and diminishing productivity that afflict
many elderly today—then we would need to
radically adjust retirement programs: do we
move the retirement age to 85, which has
negative consequences for job-seekers such

as new tenure-track academic faculty, or increase contributions to pension plans, which
puts pressure on household budgets and employers? Or both? Also, assuming birth rates
do not decline (which causes problems of its
own), longer lives will mean more pressure on
resources such as energy and food, in addition
to jobs, so this could disrupt society in negative ways.
Looking more into the distance, if enhancement technologies enable us to adapt our
bodies to, say, underwater living (with implantable gills, flippers, echolocation, new
skin, etc.), then we would need to construct
new institutions to govern that lifestyle, from
underwater real estate to pollution rules to
law enforcement to handling electronic devices to currency (replacing paper money of
non-waterworlds). Or if this sounds too farfetched, consider humanity’s rush into outer
space that will require similar attention to be
paid to such issues in the near future (Lin,
2006).
Other nearer-term scenarios that may cause
social disruption include: a job candidate with
a neural implant that enables better data retention and faster information processing
would consistently beat out unenhanced candidates; a person with super-human hearing
or sight could circumvent existing privacy protections and expectations by easily and undetectably eavesdropping or spying on others;
more students (and professors) using Ritalin
may grab admission or tenure at all the best
universities, reducing those opportunities for
others; and so on.

Ethics of Human Enhancement: 25 Questions & Answers
Copyright 2009 © Allhoff, Lin, Moor, and Weckert. All trademarks, logos and images are the property of their respective owners.

▌ 25

14. Are societal disruptions reason enough
to restrict human enhancement?
From the preceding answer, societal disruption is clearly a non-trivial concern and seems
to be something we want to mitigate where
we can, though this does not imply that we
should resist change in general. Minimizing
disruption might be achieve by transitioning
laid-off workers immediately to a new job or
job-training program, rather than allowing the
layoffs to come unexpectedly which leaves
the newly-unemployed with few options but
to fend for themselves. Today, without this
kind of preparation, we trust that these social
and economic disruptions eventually will be
handled, but there is still a real cost to those
affected by layoff that could have been better
mitigated. The typewriter industry, as an example, was blindsided by the fast-growing
word-processing industry in the 1980s, leading to the displacement of thousands of
workers, both on the manufacturing and the
end-users’ sides. (Similar situation exist for
the spreadsheet industry that displaced
countless accountants and bookkeepers, the
computer-aided design industry that displaced graphic artists, and so on.)
But, unless it will be clearly and seriously
harmful, social disruption by itself does not
seem enough to count as a strong reason
against regulating enhancement technologies.
After all, we do not wish that typewriters
were never replaced with word-processing
programs, though we hope the affected employees readily found gainful jobs elsewhere.
Human enhancement technologies, likewise,
do not necessarily need to be halted or regulated, but it seems more prudent and responsible to anticipate and prepare for any disruptive effects.

To be clear, there presumably will be benefits
to society from enhanced persons. We can
expect greater productivity or more creative
and intellectual breakthroughs, which is why
individuals would want to be enhanced in the
first place. But what remains difficult to calculate is whether these gains outweigh the
costs or risks, or even the likelihood of either
gains or costs—which is needed if we do find
it sensible to use a precautionary principle to
guide our policymaking.

15. If individuals are enhanced differently,
will communication be more difficult or
impossible?
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein
(1953) said that if a lion could speak, we could
not understand it; and in !lice’s !dventures in
Wonderland, Lewis Carroll (1865) demonstrates some problems that Alice had communicating with a caterpillar. Both examples
highlight the importance of the body in communication. For Wittgenstein sharing a language involves sharing a form of life, and lions
and humans are too different to share the
latter so they cannot share the former either.
Language is social, and we communicate with
each other about experiences that we have
reason to believe we can all understand, more
or less. This is a plausible belief given that we
are the same species, made of the same stuff,
close to the same shape, and with the same
sense organs.
But what if we were radically different from
each other? Suppose that some humans had
the vision of an eagle or could see infrared. If
some of us have enhanced vision or quite different vision, how would this affect communication and general social cohesion? Or con-
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sider a more radical situation in which someone is enhanced by the addition of a different
sense; for example, the echolocation capabilities of a bat. Suppose too that it became
possible to have enhancements of numerous
kinds and that we could choose which we
wanted, if any. Could a conservative, unenhanced human, communicate easily with
highly-enhanced neighbors who had all kinds
of experiences of which he could not conceive? Probably not. And communication
may be even more difficult between people
who have quite different enhancements.
The answer to the question is that almost certainly communication would become more
difficult. Just how difficult is partly an empirical matter, of course. Sighted people can
communicate with the sight-impaired. But
given what we know about the social nature
of language and the importance of shared
experiences in communication, it is difficult to
see how problems could be avoided. None of
this may matter of course. We, as we currently are, are social creatures, but our enhanced heirs may not be, or not in the way
that we are. They may not mind if there are
few with whom they can easily communicate.
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G.

Human Dignity & The Good
Life

16. Does the notion of human dignity suffer
with human enhancements?
The fiercest resistance to human enhancement technologies is perhaps a concern about
their effect on “human dignity” and what it
means to be human (President’s ouncil on
Bioethics, 2003; Sandel, 2007). For instance,
does the desire for enhancement show ingratitude for what we have and (further) enable
an attitude of unquenchable dissatisfaction
with one’s life? Some researchers suggest
that discontent is hardwired into the genetic
makeup of humans (Hill, 2006; Woodall,
2007), which is why we constantly innovate,
strive to achieve and gain more, etc. However, even if this is true, it does not seem to be
so much an argument to promote human enhancement technologies, but more a worry
that those technologies are not the panacea
or Holy Grail of happiness we might believe
them to be; that is, we will still be dissatisfied
with ourselves no matter how much we enhance ourselves (unless, of course, we somehow eradicate that part of our DNA that causes discontent).
Would human enhancement technologies
hinder moral development? Many believe
that “soul-making” is impossible without
struggle (Hick, 1966), and achievements ring
hollow without sacrifice or effort (President’s
Council on Bioethics, 2003); so if technology
makes life and competitions easier, then we
may lose opportunities to feed and grow our
moral character. On the other hand, compare
our lives today with pre-Internet days: in-

creased connectivity to friends, work, information, etc. is often a double-edged proposition that also increases stress and decreases
free time. This, then, raises the related concern of whether enhancement technologies
will actually make our lives happier. (If the
research mentioned above about discontent
in our genes is accurate, then we might have a
psychobiological reason to think not.)
Is the frailty of the human condition necessary to best appreciate life? There is something romantic about the notion of being mortal and fallible. But with existing pharmacology, we could eliminate the emotion of sadness
today, and work is continuing on drugs that
repress memories; but it is not clear that sadness (at least in the normal range, as opposed
to clinical depression) is a “pathology” we
should want to eliminate, rather than a human experience that we should preserve
(President’s ouncil on ioethics, 2003). Other critics have suggested that life could be too
long, leading to boredom after one’s life-goals
are achieved (e.g., Williams, 1973).
Finally, we will mention here the related, persistent concern that we are playing God with
world-changing technologies, which is presumably bad (Peters, 2007). But what exactly
counts as “playing God”, and why is that morally wrong; i.e., where exactly is the proscription in religious scripture? If we define the
concept as manipulating nature, then we all
have been guilty of that since the first man
picked up a stick. Making life-and-death decisions is a plausible candidate as a definition,
but then physicians as well as soldiers (even in
holy wars?) could be accused of this charge.
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17. Will we need to rethink the notion of a
“good life”?
Up until now, we have had a reasonably good
idea of what makes life better, and we can be
fairly confident about what makes life better
for most, and, although this is more controversial, roughly what constitutes a good life.
For Aristotle, the one thing that everyone
wanted for its own sake was happiness, and
the best way of achieving this was through a
life of contemplation, or study (Aristotle, 1941
trans.). Happiness (or eudaimonia) for Aristotle was a much richer concept than it currently is for us. It involved living well and
doing well, it was something that lasted for a
sustained period (one could not be happy for
just an hour), and it could not apply to just
one aspect of life. In general, it meant overall
success, prosperity, and achievement. It resulted from virtue, but also required external
goods, for example good birth, good children
and beauty.
James Moor argues that there are certain underlying core values that all people have
(Moor, 1999). These are: life, happiness
(pleasure), and autonomy. In order to exercise our autonomy we require the ability to
do various things, the security to do them, the
knowledge about doing them, the freedom
and opportunity to do them, and finally the
resources to accomplish our goals. In order to
achieve a good life we require all of these, but
different people will not give all of the components the same weightings, and therefore
conceptions of the good life will be different
for different people, but not radically so. Aristotle and Moor both are talking about humans as they are now.

In the future, with human enhancements,
things will be less clear. Do we know if particular “enhancements” will improve life?
Will enhanced people be happier, and if not,
why bother with enhancements? Can we say
much about the “good life” for an “enhanced”
person? One important factor is this: Currently, people around the world are more or
less the same. We know in general what sorts
of things make people happy, what makes
them suffer, what gives pleasure and pain,
and so on. If human enhancements become
widespread, it is likely that people will become very different from each other. Many
different kinds of enhancements, and enhancements to different levels may be possible, and if people are free to choose, they will
choose differently. So it may not be known
what should be done to relieve the suffering
or increase the pleasure of others. In an important respect, our commonality will be lost,
and if this is so, the notion of “the good life”
becomes vacuous in the sense of being even a
vague guide for action.
It is difficult to know whether enhancement
would make life better overall. Consider direct communication between brains: How
would this affect our privacy? Currently, my
thoughts are mine alone, more or less, something for which I am very grateful. This is not
so much because I intentionally think things
that I should not, but more that I do not have
the same sort of control over my thoughts
that I have over my actions. My autonomy
would be reduced to the extent that I would
have much less control over what people
knew about me, and this would certainly
make me more vulnerable to government and
employer control. Consider too enhanced
senses: Suppose that I had the vision of an
eagle. I really cannot say that this would im-
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prove my life, because I have no idea what it
would be like.
Humans are basically social creatures who like
living in groups, and this aspect would appear
to be under threat in a diversely enhanced
world. Could one be a friend of a much more
enhanced person? Aristotle would probably
say not. Real friends must be equals. Could I
understand this person? Wittgenstein would
have his doubts. While both Aristotle and
Wittgenstein might both appear to overstate
the case, communication and friendship are
easier between people who are similar, and
radical enhancements raise the possibility of
very diverse groups of humans (or creatures
like humans) existing. Such considerations do
suggest that there would be a need to rethink
what constitutes a good life, or even an improved life, for humans.
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H.

Rights & Obligations

18. Is there a right to be enhanced?
Rights can be divided into two broad classes:
a class of human rights, sometimes called
“natural rights”, and a class of more conventional rights based on the specific customs,
roles, and laws of a society. Examples of the
former are famously listed in the American
Declaration of Independence: “We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit
of Happiness/” The right to enhancement is
not included in this list or in other familiar
lists of human rights. But it could be argued
that a right of enhancement is a right derived
from some or all of the human rights like
those listed in the Declaration of Independence. Humans should be able to exercise
their right to enhancements to the extent that
it promotes their life, liberty, or the pursuit of
happiness.
However, this at most would make a right to
enhancement a prima facie right because
human rights themselves, though fundamental, can conflict and are susceptible to modification and qualification/ One’s right to liberty, for example, does not automatically permit infringement on the rights of others.
Rights frequently trump in our considerations
about which action is correct. But rights can
also be trumped by other rights or by extremely harmful consequences. Therefore,
even if the right to enhancement is regarded
as a derived human right, its application in a
particular situation could be challenged on

the grounds that it infringes on the rights of
others or that its exercise would lead to extreme harm.
The right to enhancement can also be regarded as conventional/ “onventional” does
not mean “arbitrary” but “established by general agreement or practice/” We can make
laws, for example, that allow some enhancements and laws that prohibit others. How
justified such conventional rights or prohibitions are depends upon how good the reasons
for them are. We might easily justify the use
of nanodevices that patrol our bodies for cancerous outbreaks. We would prohibit the use
of nanodevices that would give humans a
burst of intelligence followed by likely seizures and strokes.
Discussion of rights remains controversial in
philosophical circles. Some argue that the
justification of human enhancement in particular could be better carried out in terms of
fundamental values such as life, health, knowledge and sociability (Hopkins, 2008). But
arguments based on rights and arguments
based on human values tend to emphasize
common notions of human dignity and the
good life.

19. Could human enhancement give us
greater or fewer rights?
Future enhancements could either increase or
decrease our rights. Today, this is played out
in the world of sports where the enhancements may come through the use of drugs.
Those in charge of a sport must set the rules
to allow or forbid enhancements. In swimming, some aquadynamic swimsuits are allowed and some or not. Now suppose nanodevices of the future alter our bodies when
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we are in the water to make us more aquadynamic. Should such enhanced swimmers be
allowed to compete against unenhanced
swimmers? In situations like this, judgments
about rights that take into account fairness
have to be made. The nanoenhanced swimmers could be prohibited from competing at
all or they could be given a new right to compete within a new class of swimmers or, if the
nanoenhancement is easily obtainable by all
competitors, the right to use it could be extended to everyone. Consider the case of
Oscar Pistorius, the South African sprinter
who had his legs amputated when he was a
year old but now runs on artificial legs (Edwards, 2008a). He missed the qualifying time
for the 2008 Summer Olympics by just threequarters of a second. Some argue that his
new legs, which give considerable spring to
his run and do not require blood circulation,
have given him an enhancement that should
not be allowed in races with normal runners.
Others argue that he should not lose the right
to compete with non-disabled runners. The
boundaries of our rights will continue to shift
as further enhancements are developed.
Beyond sports we might imagine what rights
and duties would be affected if future enhancements give some individuals in society
much greater physical and mental abilities
than they have now: Should they have greater
rights or liberties than unenhanced persons?
Would the enhanced then have some duty to
care for the unenhanced, just as the betterinformed and capable parent has a duty to
care for her child? Human enhancement may
create a wide moral chasm between the
haves and have-nots. In such a case, resolving
issues of rights and responsibilities will take
on considerable importance to avoid significant social and economic disruptive effects

20. Is there an obligation in some circumstance to be enhanced?
In some circumstances, there may be an obligation or at least a strong argument to enhance. Assuming vaccinations are enhancements, we have an obvious example of a case
in which enhancements are required or at
least strongly recommended. We require
pilots to have training and pass stringent
tests, necessary for the enhancements of a
prospective pilot’s capabilities for everyone’s
safety. Today, prisoners wear ankle bracelets
that transmit information about their location. This is a kind of enhancement we allow,
given prisoners have forfeited some of their
rights; moreover, there is a strong argument
for doing this because it relieves overpopulation in prisons while guarding against possible
flight risk by a nonviolent offender.
One area in which we can expect required
enhancements to increase is the military. In
the military, soldiers have fewer rights than
civilians; they lose freedoms and have to obey
reasonable orders. Of course, that is the issue: Is it reasonable for the military to require
enhancement of soldiers beyond their usual
training? One likely possibility is the use of
nanochip “dog tags” that will allow soldiers to
be identified in case of death. Such chips
could also be locators for supervising officers
to track them—how useful on the battlefield
to know where all of your soldiers are and
know the state of their health. Naturally,
weapons and equipment will also be enhanced. Today, there are prototypes of devices that make soldiers almost invisible by
projecting the scene behind them in front of
them. But there is no reason to stop there.
Why not implant devices so that soldiers can
be ordered to do what you want either

Ethics of Human Enhancement: 25 Questions & Answers
Copyright 2009 © Allhoff, Lin, Moor, and Weckert. All trademarks, logos and images are the property of their respective owners.

▌ 32

through oral and written commands or
through direct connections to the decision
and motor operations of their brains? At
some point, such enhancements have crossed
the line of which enhancements should be
allowed, let alone required. Nevertheless, the
need for quick, effective, and decisive actions
by the military will put significant pressure
toward producing a super soldier.

21. Should children be enhanced?
Whether children should be enhanced is a
particularly difficult issue. We give adults
considerable freedom to do what they wish to
themselves, as long as it does not harm others. But children are children. Parents must
face the issue of parental rights and responsibilities associated with decisions to enhance
children, whether directly (after the child is
born) or indirectly through germ-line enhancements (to the parent’s transmittable
genes, prior to the child’s birth) (Allhoff,
2005). This generates quandaries about selecting the proper actions that will only be
exacerbated by future enhancement possibilities through nanotechnology. On the one
hand, if parents enhance children with nanotechnology, they will be making crucial decisions about the capabilities of their children
that may be irreversible and limit their children’s future choices and opportunities/ Will
the child agree with the choices when he or
she is older? On the other hand, parents already make similar choices in many areas on
behalf of their children. Insomuch as parents
generally strive to provide the best for their
children—e.g., quality of school/education, a
proper diet, moral guidance, etc.—will enhancements overstep any bounds in that effort? Prevailing wisdom suggests that parents
do not have an unlimited right to raise their

children however the parents want; that right,
if one exists, seems to be limited by health
and safety concerns related to the child.
Some have argued at least with regard to
education that children possess a further right
beyond health and safety. Article 26 of the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone has the right
to education and that education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. These rights in turn suggest duties for
parents and for society. If education is a kind
of social enhancement, this lays the groundwork for claiming that other kinds of enhancements might be the right of children
and correlative duties of parents and children.
Will, for example, children of the future be
expected to receive enhancements of their
bodies that lead to “the full development of
human personality”? Exactly what might be
required will depend on the facts of the situation, of course. As we have said, context
matters. But what this account shows is that
there is at least a possible line of argument
that supports not only the right of children to
be enhanced but also a duty of their parents
or society to do it.
Another difficulty raised with enhancing children turns on the therapy-enhancement distinction that we discussed in question 4.
Therapy is often required on a child’s behalf,
whereas enhancement may be more voluntary. In the deaf community, an ongoing debate
occurs about whether treating deafness is
therapy or enhancement. Some in the deaf
community maintain that being deaf is not
something that needs treating. The deaf
community functions with its own language
and community. This would be undermined if
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deafness were removed. This leads some to
argue that deaf children do not require therapy and there is no decisive reason why deaf
children should receive enhancement such as
a cochlear implant. Indeed, real-world cases
exist in which, e.g., deaf parents have been
permitted to deliberately select embryos for
in vitro fertilization that would lead to deaf
babies. Others believe that deafness requires
therapy. On this latter view there is much
more pressure put on parents of a deaf child
to perform their duty of care toward health
and safety and install a cochlear implant for
therapeutic reasons.
Another common concern about enhancing
children lies in the possibility that parents will
enhance their children to give them an edge
in society. Rather than simply buying them
new laptops for school, in the future parents
might buy nanochips for their children’s bodies. The size of our working memory has
much to do with our intelligence. Suppose
some nanochips could be added to instantly
give children a larger working memory; what
an advantage they would have over other
children without them. Of course, it is not
only cognitive enhancement but also the enhancement of beauty and functionality of
other parts of the body that might be possible. Beauty queens and track stars could be
made, improving the outcomes of the genetic
lottery. The likely result of such an enhancement race by parents will strike many as an
unhealthy and unsound approach to developing the potential children—but how do we
prevent it?
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I.

Policy & Law

22. What are the policy implications of human enhancement?
Given the preceding discussion, it should be
clear that human enhancement is more than
just about the individual’s freedom or autonomy, but there are plausibly negative consequences on others and society that need to
be considered. Or at least an argument needs
to be made that freedom/autonomy trumps
all other values, but such a position seems
unnecessarily dogmatic. These issues point to
the policy dilemma of whether we should
have regulations or restrictions on human
enhancement technologies, so to prevent or
mitigate some of the negative impacts considered. Three answers suggest themselves: (1)
no restrictions, (2) some restrictions, or (3) a
moratorium or full ban.
A moratorium seems unrealistic to the extent
that a worldwide one would be needed to
truly stem the use of human enhancement
technologies, and that no worldwide moratorium on anything has yet to work, including
on (alleged) attempts to clone a human being.
A local moratorium would send patients to
“back-alley” enhancement clinics or to more
liberal regions of the world, as is the case with
“cosmetic-surgery vacations” in which those
medical procedures are less expensive in other nations. Further, a ban on enhancement
research seems much too premature—an
overreaction to perceived, future risks—as
well as a real threat to therapy-related research today.

On the other side of the spectrum, the idea of
having no restrictions on human enhancement technologies seems to be reckless or at
least unjustifiably optimistic, given that there
are plausible risks. As pointed out earlier,
complete freedom or autonomy may be a
recipe for disaster and chaos in any case; we
do not want to grant the right to yell “Fire!” in
a crowded venue or the right for dangerous
felons to own firearms.5
So what about finding middle ground with
some non-Draconian regulations? Critics have
argued that any regulation would be imperfect and likely ineffectual, much like laws
against contraband or prostitution (Naam,
2005); but it is not clear that eliminating these
laws would improve the situation, all things
considered. Also, as a society, we still believe
we ought to at least try to solve social ills,
even if we cannot ultimately fix the entire
problem, e.g., we cannot stop any given crime
from ever occurring again, yet we still have
laws against such acts. And even if there are
practical reasons to not pursue regulations,
would that send the wrong message; e.g., to
children, that we support enhancement without reservations?
The issue of regulation will surely not be settled here, nor do we intend it to. Yet it is important to keep in mind that the human enhancement debate is not just a theoretical
discussion about ethics, but it has bearing on
the real world with policy decisions that may
affect not just the would-be enhanced, but
also researchers, manufacturers, social institutions, as well as our ideals of freedom and
human dignity (Lin, 2007).

5

Perhaps even the right to be happy may be
inappropriately exercised, say, at a funeral?
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23. Should there be limits on enhancements
allowed, e.g., for military purposes?
At this stage, without knowing exactly what
kinds of human-enhancing devices and treatments will be invented, the answer is unclear.
As we discussed previously, there may be a
compelling case to limit those enhancements
that pose serious health risks to the individual
or profoundly upset social institutions, at least
until we are able to evolve those institutions—such as sports or college admissions—
to account for an enhancement divide.
Gratuitous enhancements seem to be an easy
case. To the extent that they are not harmful
to the individual, e.g., an ordinary tattoo, and
are not public nuisances, e.g., a profane and
visible tattoo that offends the sensibilities of
others, there does not seem to be a compelling reason to limit them, apart from some
argument that they desecrate the body and
impinge upon human dignity.
Unenhancements (see question 8 above) pose a
more difficult case study in that we must balance the interest and expressed will of the
individual against what most persons would
consider to be deliberate and serious harm to
one’s self/
Military applications of human enhancement
technologies presents an even trickier moral
and social dilemma: should we be in the business of weaponizing or modifying humans for
someone else’s ends, specifically to inflict
harm on others or otherwise better prosecute
a war (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2006)? We will also
not fully address such a complicated issue
here, except to note that it involves considerations related to arms proliferation (e.g., does
this encourage other nations to invest in similar research?), national priorities (e.g., might

research funding be better spent elsewhere,
given that any advantage we gain may be
temporary until our enemies replicate our
technologies, as they historically do?), asymmetrical warfare (e.g., if enemies are more
easily defeated by our super-soldiers, will
they adapt by taking more desperate measures, such as more aggressively pursuing nuclear or biochemical weapons?), and other issues familiar to ethics and warfare.

24. Might enhanced humans count as someone’s intellectual property?
Generally speaking, naturally-occurring objects (e.g., air, water, other raw materials)
cannot be patented, and human beings cannot be legally owned; so whether one could
patent or otherwise claim intellectual property (IP) rights over an enhanced human seems
to be a moot question. However, there might
be more to this issue, once we recognize the
related debate on biotechnology patenting,
specifically as it relates to genomics. (Engineered biomedical devices, such as an artificial heart or knee, would clearly be patenteligible under existing US law, though we will
return shortly to the question of whether they
ought to be.)
In the US, the biotechnology-patenting debate starts with the landmark legal decision
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, in which the Supreme Court (by a narrow 5-4 margin) ruled
that a genetically-modified, oil-eating bacterium—which is not naturally occurring—is
patent-eligible (US Supreme Court, 1980).
Since then, the courts have also established
that parts or sequences of genes, though not
the entire gene itself, may be patented if its
function is also articulated (e.g., US Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2009). Thus, it
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is possible that some sequence of a gene may
be discovered, isolated, and functionalized in
a human-enhancing application, e.g., to slow
or halt aging or give us superhuman strength
or vision. If that happens, then the usual consequences of patent protection would likely
occur, i.e., the cost of such a procedure or
drug would be high, at least for the first 20
years, given a lack of direct competitors.
This particular consequence strikes at the
core of the access concern, as discussed previously: Whether through genomics, robotics,
or other technologies, the ability to acquire
enhanced abilities will turn on the individual’s
ability to pay. Putting aside the issue of
whether we have a right to enhance ourselves
and how that is impacted by the high cost of
such devices and treatments, it may be reasonably expected that IP law would create an
“enhancement divide” between the enhanced
(those who can afford it) and unenhanced
(those who cannot afford to pay), which is
cause for concern.
Furthermore, again setting rights aside, it will
undoubtedly be argued that some humanenhancing treatments ought to belong to all
of humanity and not be protected by IP law.
For instance, it would seem immoral to withhold or otherwise raise barriers (such as to
charge a price that some are unable to pay) to
receive some therapy that can cure cancer or
aging, just as it is to deny access to basic materials needed for our survival, e.g., food and
water. Such IP may represent essential discoveries needed to move science ahead: for
instance, in nanotechnology, there are already criticisms that patents are a hindrance
to basic science (Bawa, 2004). As an analogy,
imagine how stunted science would be if the
first microscope had been patented and its
use restricted to only those who could afford

to pay a licensing fee, or how radically different our world today would be if merely accessing the Internet required a similar use-fee
(on top of any service provider fees). Further,
it can be—and has been—claimed that all IP
rights are harmful to innovation and indeed
contradict the basic principles of a freemarket economy, since they are essentially
legalized monopolies (Boldrin and Levine,
2008; Torrance and Tomlinson, 2009). Without the protection of patents and copyrights,
companies would be forced to compete on
price, quality, customer service, and so on,
which is a competition that seems to be good
for broader public. Open-source computing is
an example of such a business model.
Of course, the opposing side will rely on the
standard argument that IP rights are a necessary form of incentive for innovation: without
IP protection, companies and individuals
would be much less likely to risk investing
time and research funds to develop products
that can simply be copied by competitors
(Lessig, 2002). We will not engage this larger
debate on whether or not IP law promotes
social goods, except to reiterate that it has a
bearing on the issue of fairness and access to
human enhancement technologies.

25. Will we need to rethink ethics itself?6
To a large extent, our ethics depends on the
kinds of creatures that we are. Philosophers
traditionally have based ethical theories on
assumptions about human nature. With enhancements we may become relevantly dif-

6

This section builds upon previous work: James
H. Moor, “Why We Need Better Ethics for
Emerging Technologies”, Ethics and Information
Technology (2005) 7: 111-119.
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ferent creatures and therefore need to rethink our basic ethical positions. For example,
will we be as sympathetic toward other humans that differ substantially from us in their
nature? We may need to do ethics differently. Converging technologies—for example,
nanotechnology, neurotechnology, genetics
and information technology—will almost certainly enable some dramatic enhancements,
at least in the medium term.
The emergence of these potentially powerful
technologies raises the question of what our
technological future will be like. Will the
quality of our lives improve with increased
technology or not? We at least collectively
can affect our futures by choosing which
technologies to have and which not to have
and by choosing how technologies that we
pursue will be used. The question really is:
How well will we choose? The emergence of
a wide variety of new technologies should
give us a sense of urgency in thinking about
how we approach these technologies and enhancements ethically. Which kinds should we
develop and keep? And, how should we utilize those that we do keep? It is not satisfactory to do ethics as usual. Better ethical
thinking in terms of being better informed
and better ethical action in terms of being
more proactive are required.
Technologies, particularly new converging
technologies for human enhancement, generate many ethical problems. Sometimes the
problems can be treated easily under existing
ethical policies. But because new technology
allows us to perform activities in new ways,
situations may arise in which we do not have
adequate policies in place to guide us. We are
confronted with policy vacuums. We need to
formulate and justify new policies (laws, rules,
and customs) for acting in these new kinds of

situations. Sometimes we can anticipate that
the use of the technology will have consequences that are clearly undesirable. As
much as possible, we need to anticipate these
and establish policies that will minimize the
deleterious effects of the new technology. At
other times the subtleties of the situation
may escape us, at least initially, and we will
find ourselves in a situation of assessing the
matter as consequences unfold. Formulating
and justifying new policies is complicated by
the fact that the concepts that we bring to a
policy-vacuum situation may not provide a
unique understanding of the situation: the
situation may have analogies with different
and competing traditional situations. We find
ourselves in a conceptual muddle about which
way to understand the matter in order to
formulate and justify a policy.
To avoid such a quandary, first, we need realistically to take into account that ethics is an
ongoing and dynamic enterprise. Second, we
can improve ethics by establishing better collaborations among ethicists, scientists, social
scientists, and technologists. We need a multi-disciplinary approach (Brey, 2000). The
third improvement for ethics would be to develop more sophisticated ethical analyses.
Ethical theories themselves are often simplistic and do not give much guidance to particular situations. Often the alternative is to do
technological assessment in terms of
cost/benefit analysis. This approach too easily invites evaluation in terms of money while
ignoring or discounting moral values which
are difficult to represent or translate into
monetary terms. At the very least, we need
to be more proactive and less reactive in
doing ethics (Moor and Weckert, 2004).
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J.

Conclusion

In the above, we offer a preliminary survey of
many of the major questions in the ethics debate on human enhancement. A full discussion is beyond the scope of this investigation
and, indeed, could take an entire book to satisfactorily answer each question. But our
brief introduction here is valuable as an entry
point to the human enhancement ethics controversy, which is quickly gaining momentum
and complexity.
An impressive array of technologies is driving
the urgency of this debate, from familiar
drugs (e.g., steroids, modafinil, Ritalin) to fantastic visions of a cybernetic future. No one
knows which visions—utopian, dystopian, or
pedestrian—ultimately will be realized. But
insofar as there are good reasons to think that
many of these visions are plausible, it seems
prudent to at least begin a conversation about
the many ethical and social issues associated

with human enhancement, especially since
ethics seem to historically lag (far) behind
technology and other quickly-evolving events.
By planning ahead, we can be better prepared
to enact legislation or regulation as deemed
fit.
In our discussions, we have striven to follow a
disinterested, sensible middle path in presenting the various sides of each issue, given the
early stage of this debate, though clearly
there are passionate and opposing forces engaged in this international struggle for clarity
and policy. An increasing flow of thoughtful
literature exists as we write this (e.g., Savulescu and Bostrom, 2009), and we expect the
arguments to continue for many more
years—proving the prediction that human
enhancement ethics will be the most important debate in science and society is this
brave new century. Because human enhancement is such a personal matter, for the
moment, we leave it to our readers to use
their own moral compass to navigate these
myriad camps and find their own path to ethical answers.
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From Science to Ethics, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, in press).
2. Fritz Allhoff and Patrick Lin (eds.), Nanotechnology & Society: Current and Emerging Ethical Is
sues, (Dordrecht: Springer, hardback in April 2008, paperback in October 2008).
3. Fritz Allhoff, Patrick Lin, James Moor, and John Weckert, Nanoethics: The Ethical and Social Di
mensions of Nanotechnology (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., hardback and paperback in
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Journal Papers
1. Fritz !llhoff, “The oming Era of Nanomedicine”, American Journal of Bioethics 9.10 (2009): In
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on ‘The oming Era of Nanomedicine’” (forthcoming)/
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Feb 2009.
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